June 26, 2008

The other day Roger Cohen of the International Herald Tribune had a column in the NYT about Turkey. There were some things about the column that I liked, and other parts of it that I felt a little uncomfortable with.

Like a lot of people who write on Turkey, Cohen describes the country as a “bridge,” and emphasizes the extent to which Islam in country does not fit in with George W. Bush’s conception of the world.

The first question I have, however, is: what country is made for ‘Bushworld?’ The comments above are indeed true for Turkey—but they are also true for most Muslim (and non-Muslim) societies in the world.

Secondly, Cohen mirrors the views of a lot of Turkey observers with regard to his understanding of “secularism” in Turkey (I put ‘secularism’ in quotes, because Turkey’s form of laicism, which emphasizes state control over religious institutions, bears little resemblance to secularism as it is practiced in the United States, where the emphasis is upon a separation of state and religious institutions). Like many other people who write on Turkey, Cohen sees Turkey’s relatively (compared to most Middle Eastern countries, and indeed compared to most Muslim-majority states) high levels of social and political freedom as resulting primarily from “secularist” policies adopted during the early years of the Republic.

‘Secularism’ is, of course, along with ‘Republicanism,’ one of the two most important of the six principles of the Republic. But, in the twentieth century, many states with majority Muslim populations undertook secularist projects not unlike Turkey’s. Syria is an example. Iran is another. Egypt a third. In the Middle East and elsewhere in the “Muslim World,” ‘secularism’ (usually laicism) was hardly the exception in the twentieth century, it was quite common.

Which leads me to believe that Turkey’s laicism is not the only variable behind the country’s relative social and political freedom. There are other factors involved, one of the most important of which being Turkey’s status as the successor state to the Ottoman Empire’s legacy dating back to 1300. Indeed, parliaments, political demonstrations, a largely free press, and other staples of an open political society existed in the Ottoman Empire before the creation of the Turkish Republic in 1923.

Don’t get me wrong: I’m a fan of secularism, too. However, the Turkish state’s hard line vis-à-vis the open practice of Islam should not be confused with secularism as it is practiced in this country, and nor should it be seen as the only, or even the main, reason behind Turkey’s political openness. Indeed, if anything, 'secularism' as it is practiced in Turkey has, more than once, given the country's military and bureaucracy an excuse for intervening in politics. People can disagree on whether or not Turkey's various military and bureaucratic interventions into politics have been healthy for the country or not. (Indeed, this was a topic I looked into in my Master's thesis at Princeton). However, it's an issue that deserves to be debated, rather than short-circuited or ignored.

Indeed, Cohen’s column appears against the backdrop of the latest such intervention. As I discuss in a June 6 posting, the country's constitutional court has agreed to hear a case calling for the ruling AK Party to be shut down and for dozens of AK Party members (including Abdullah Gül and Tayyıp Erdoğan, the president and prime minister) to be banned from politics for up to five years.

Cohen says that he would be against the ban, but that he wouldn’t be very sorry if it occurred.

So, I guess that Cohen's argument is that democracy is a good thing for Turkey, except for when it isn't. And indeed, lots of Turkish people—including most of my Turkish friends—would agree with this view. Like Cohen, they are apparently optimistic that Turkish voters who supported the AK Party and its earlier permutations will continue to be patient. I hope they're right.