• Reports in the news this week were a little bit more pessimistic regarding the ongoing normalization talks taking place between Turkey and Armenia. Unsurprisingly, the talks have become bogged down in the aftermath of Turkish government's more forceful declarations that the issue of opening Turkey's border with Armenia must take place only after Armenia and Azerbaijan come to a negotiated settlement regarding the status of Nagorno-Karabakh—Azerbaijan's importance to Turkey was perhaps reinforced to Turkish leaders during the course of Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan's visit this week to Baku, which included sobering topics such as the rate Turkey would pay Azerbaijan for natural gas after Baku's recent threats to cut off gas supplies to Turkey if Ankara should unilaterally normalize relations with Armenia. Meanwhile, the Armenian government, which apparently had been hoping that the border could be re-opened without producing much change in the status quo regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, has accused Turkey of "interfering" in the Azeri-Armenian talks.

Are we still cool? Erdoğan and Aliyev meeting in Baku. Photo courtesy Asbarez.com

I've discussed the Turkish-Armenian talks elsewhere, so I'll keep things brief here. My sense is that Turkey pursued this path to normalization at least partly as a result of American pressure. The Armenian government certainly wants the border open, but I'm unconvined that they're willing to withdraw from Nagorno-Karabakh, or undertake the steps on Nagorno-Karabakh that the Azeri government would demand (indeed, when asked about Nagorno-Karabkh during talks with Turkish officials last month, Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalband simply replied that the best way forward was through the Minsk Group, the OSCE-sponsored commission which has overseen Nagorno-Karabakh talks, without much concrete success, for the last 17 years). 

In many ways, it seems like squaring this triangle of interests between Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan will be very difficult. Turkish leaders, I sense, feel that they've done their part by meeting with the Armenians and agreeing on a "roadmap" to normalization. But as long as this normalization depends upon Armenia and Azerbaijan working out a mutually satisfactory arrangement regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, it will really require some creative and courageous diplomacy on the part of all three states for a solution to be found.

• Turkish leaders continue to respond to a recent declaration by French President Sarkozy and German Chancellor Merkel that EU expansion plans should not include Turkey, instead calling for a "privileged partnership" between Turkey and the European Union. On Tuesday, Turkish President Abdullah Gul had struck a more conciliatory tone, declaring that, while "politicians [such as Sarkozy and Merkel] come and go," Turkey's responsibility was to take care of its own responsibilities in ongoing membership talks with the EU, and do whatever is necessary to put Turkey in a position to meet the EU's ascension requirements. Later in the week, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan struck a more defensive posture. Speaking at Odansk University during the course of an official visit to Poland, Erdoğan asked "is it because the majority of Turkey's citizens are Muslim that you won't accept us?" "If you don't want us," said Erdoğan, "then say so." Erdoğan also added that "right now there are five million Muslims living in the EU. We [Muslims] are already in Europe." 

The issue of EU membership is an interesting one in Turkish politics. I think the general impression in the United States is that most people in Turkey are desperate to join the EU. This may have been the case back in the 1980s and 90s, but I think the enthusiasm for Turkey's ascension has dampened considerably in recent years. In particular, many people feel that Europe will never allow Turkey to join, particularly after economic basket-cases like Romania and Bulgaria were able to jump the queue ahead of Turkey, while countries like the Baltic states—where large numbers of Russians remain stateless—with serious human rights issues of their own joined the EU with nowhere near the amount of scrutiny that Turkey has received for its own human rights problems.

While so-called "Islamic" parties in Turkey (like Refah in the 1990s) were considered lukewarm on the question of joining the EU, the AK Party government (which is in many ways the successor to Refah) has made joining the European Union a major policy objective. Indeed, harmonizing Turkey's laws with Europe (not to mention re-writing the Turkish constitution to make the closure of political parties like AK more difficult) is understood by many in Turkey as, among other things, essential to making the political atmosphere in Turkey more amenable to a party like AK by making it more difficult for the military to play a role in the country's political life.

• Taraf newspaper is reporting that one of the crimes for which Mehmet Ağar is being accused of committing is ordering the murder of three Kurdish businessmen in the 1990s. 

It's interesting to see Ağar's name in the papers again. In many ways, I think that what happens with Ağar will be a good indication of what will happen with the Ergenekon investigation more generally. Ağar was put on trial last November for his alleged role in the Susurluk scandal of the late 1990s (which I discussed here last fall and here back when I was living in Turkey in the 90s), even though—-aside from requiring Ağar to make a brief appearance in court in February—the trial has not made much visible progress since then. My own fear is that the Ergenekon investigation, which began as an inquiry into the "deep state" in Turkey (the alleged formation of death squads and drug-running operations with state funds and offficials in the name of counter-terrorism), has perhaps been transformed into a political trial devoted to punishing perceived enemies of the governing AK Party. In particular, I wonder why Ağar's trial is not being included as part of the broader Ergenekon investigation.

Given everything that Agar is presumed to know about the "deep state" and its sponsors, many people in Turkey are skeptical that he will ever be the subject of a real trial, and it is assumed that, if he is found guilty, he will not be given anything more than a token punishment. We'll see. But if you are looking for clues regarding what will happen with regard to Ergenekon more generally, keep an eye on what happens with Ağar (as well as Sedat Bucak).

• On Saturday morning, it was reported that an American traveling to Iraq had been detained at Istanbul's Ataturk Airport after complaining of flu-like symptoms. Later tests revealed that this traveler, who had arrived on a plane from Amsterdam, has the "swine flu" virus. Turkish medical authorities are expected to comment on this situation in a press conference soon.