I've been back in the US for about two weeks, and it's been a pretty hectic time.

I arrived in Ann Arbor on June 11, but left for Illinois the following Wednesday in order to attend a workshop in Urbana-Champaign entitled Russia's Role in Human Mobility. I had a good time at the workshop. Steve Kotkin was the keynote speaker, which was nice, and I liked having the chance to see a lot of people that I know and to meet some new people.


All aboard! On my way to Urbana-Champaign

The papers at the workshop were pre-circulated, so each of us (there were about twenty presenters) spoke informally for about 5-10 minutes about their paper, project, future plans, etc. All of the presentations related in some way to "human mobility," so people spoke on topics pertaining to travel, migration, railways, systems of coach travel, wheelchair travel, and other mobility-related themes.

Campus and Library at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

Frankly, I've had enough of mobility for now and am focusing upon being stationary (hareketsizlik sums it up more nicely), particularly with regard to my physical location. All I want to do is sit in Michigan and write, read, and prepare for this fall. I've got a large house to myself, a back porch, a recently souped-up bicycle, and—thanks to geek0086—an internet connection that I'm able to pick off in a couple of the west-facing rooms.

Meanwhile, back in Turkey, there's been a lot of excitement taking place over a supposed plan among some people in the military to dismantle the ruling AK Party and to defame Fethullah Gülen. It's a curious case which began two weeks ago when Taraf newspaper announced that it had uncovered evidence of a plan among some people in the Turkish military to do away with (bitirmek) the AK Party and Gülen's movement.

For those people who don't follow Turkish politics regularly, some introduction might be necessary: the AK Party, which has been in power in Turkey since 2002, is considered an "Islamic" party among many of their political opponents in Turkey (including many people in the military). In terms of actual policies that the AK Party has pursued during the course of their seven years in power, Turkey doesn't appear to be much closer to becoming an Islamic republic today than it was in 2002. Nevertheless, the AK Party is not trusted by its political opponents, who often assume that the AK Party is employing the discourses of democracy only as a tactic to gain power. Once the "Islamists," as they are called by their political opponents, gain control over all of the institutions of the state (the bureaucracy, the police, schools, the military), their political opponents fear they will slowly transform Turkey into an increasingly "Islamic" society.

Fethullah Gülen, the other supposed target of the military's alleged campaign, is a preacher who gained considerable popularity in Turkey in the 1990s. Wealthy businessmen who followed Gülen's teachings made contributions to foundations led by Gülen's supporters. These foundations opened schools in Turkey as well as in Muslim-inhabited regions of the former Soviet Union (such as Kazan, Ufa, and Baku). Gülen's followers are also thought to control or influence a number of Turkish media holdings, including the newspaper Zaman and the television station Samanyolu.

Since 1998, Gülen has been living in exile in the United States, where he fled after a video (which some people claimed was a montage) was released in which Gülen appeared to be exhorting his followers to hide their beliefs, find their way into state institutions, then show their true colors only later. In 2000 a trial began in Turkey his absence in which he was accused of plotting to overthrow the secular order of Turkey. In 2006 he was acquitted.

Gülen now resides in Pennsylvania, but his followers remain active in Turkey as well as in other countries. They are involved in a number of activities, including the opening of schools, the publishing of various journals and books, and the holding of vaguely academic-sounding conferences. Followers argue that Fethullah Gülen's teachings are based upon the principles of interfaith dialogue and tolerance, and they often present the Ottoman Empire as a model of religious tolerance. Detractors in Turkey, the United States, and elsewhere see his movement as a threat. Many people in Turkey believe that, sooner or later, the AK Party will endeavor to allow Fetullah Gülen to return to Turkey. 

Is the coast clear for Gülen's return to Turkey?

While the AK Party and the Gülen movement doubtless overlap, there are some distinctions between them. Nevertheless, it would be hardly shocking that some in the military would want to see both the AK Party and the Gülen movement discredited. The question is, can Taraf's accusations hold up to scrutiny?

According to Taraf's report, the secret plan in the military to "put an end to" (son vermek) the AK Party and the Gülen movement. The four-page plan, says Taraf, was found in the office of Serdar Ӧztürk, who has been jailed as part of the ongoing Ergenekon investigation. Signed by Senior Staff Colonel Dursun Çiçek ("Chi-chek"), the plan outlined plots allegedly set up by individuals in the military to frame individuals associated with the AK Party and Gülen movement by planting weapons and ammunition in their homes. State authorities were also supposedly going to plant stories in the media which made Gülen-friendly media operations look bad.

There is some doubt as to whether or not this document is authentic. The document upon which Taraf made these claims was actually a photocopy, which means Çiçek's signature could have easily been lifted from somewhere else and inserted into the document. Military investigators have said the document is a forgery and that there is no need to investigate Çiçek, while General İlker Başbuğ ("Bash-boo"), chief of the general staff, has argued that this entire story has been created in order to smear the military.

Now Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan, the leader of the AK Party, is calling for the creation of an independent (civilian) commission to investigate the issue—an approach that Başbuğ came out against just a few days earlier. In response to Erdogan's suggestion that a civilian court depose Çiçek, Başbuğ called a news conference. With all of the country's senior military leaders at his side, Başbuğ warned the government to "keep your hands off the military."

To be honest, I have absolutely no idea who is lying here—or lying more, as the case may be. Without question, the military is capable of doing much worse than simply framing innocent people. I wouldn't be surprised for a second to find that they are actually involved in plans to discredit certain groups and politicians. Indeed, if all the military did was discredit governments (rather than overthrow them), Turkey would be a very different place today.

What would surprise me, however, would be that military leaders found it necessary to put "plans" like this to paper, sign their names to them, and then leave them lying around in places where these documents could be easily found. After all, the Ergenekon investigation has been going on for two years, and it's been nearly eighteen months since the investigation was re-oriented towards supposed enemies of the AK Party government. Hundreds of individuals considered hostile to the AK Party have been detained, their homes and offices searched, the lands outside their homes dug up for incriminating contraband. Leaving such materials around—typing them up and signing them in the first place—therefore seems like a strange risk for people to run under current circumstances. If Turkish military leaders, who have pulled off four major military interventions (the last in 1997) over the past half-century, have really become this clumsy when it comes to dealing with civilian governments, then we have truly entered a new era in Turkey.

Indeed, if we are to believe the Ergenekon narrative, not only are Turkish military officials less discreet about anti-government actions than they were in the past, they have also become less self-sufficient. According to the people prosecuting Ergenekon (and their media cheering section in the form of Zaman and Taraf), not only were military officials involved in planning a "coup" against the AK Party (a charge that emerged long before Taraf's recent claims about the supposed Çiçek document), but also a legion of university academics, journalists, and other civilians were also supposedly involved in a plot to topple the AK Party from power. Apparently, not only has the Turkish military lots its touch regarding secrecy, but it can no longer even plan a coup without the help of university professors!

Everything that's happened over the last two weeks constitutes just the latest chapter in an extended process of adjustment that's been taking place in Turkey since the AK Party came to power seven years ago. The military is reluctant to intervene directly and openly, and even in the supposed "coup by press conference" of 1998, military leaders made it abundantly clear their lack of stomach for an open takeover. But they also made it clear that, if they consider it necessary, they will indeed intervene.

The course the Ergenekon investigation has taken over the last several months—with numerous current and retired officers being detained and charged with crimes against the state—indicates that, on at least some level, some military officials are working with the AK Party—at least to the point of cooperating with the investigation, and perhaps making deals. There is no single "military" view, and probably no single view among even high-ranking officials. Some military officials are being targeted—perhaps with good cause, perhaps unjustifiably—by Ergenekon. Others, meanwhile, are allowing this to happen. At times, Ergenekon seems like it could erupt into full-on war between the AK Party and the military, which means the AK Party loses. At other times, however, it appears like efforts are being made to split the differences.

The AK Party, meanwhile, is playing for time—having recently avoided (thanks to intimidation through the Ergenekon trial?) closure in 2008, and currently proposing changes to the constitution making it more difficult for a party like AK to be closed.

Whatever you do, pay attention to where you're getting your news regarding this story. Taraf (which I've discussed elsewhere) and Zaman both emphasize the perfidy of the military and treat the Ergenekon narrative at face value. Meanwhile, opposition newspapers like Cumhuriyet and Hürriyet are duly skeptical of both the recent claims by Taraf and the Ergenekon narrative more generally—yet are decidedly less critical of the military's behavior in response to this scandal (but not only this scandal).

As is the case with the Ergenekon trial more generally, the fight over the Çiçek memo is turning into another proxy battle relating to the question of how people feel about the AK Party and the military more generally. Someone was trying to smear somebody—only we don't know who, and probably never will.