Juan Cole has posted some typically informative commentary on Israeli-Turkish relations and the recent threat by Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu to break off all diplomatic relations with Israel . Turkey wants an apology from Israel, or at the very least an establishment of an international commission (Israel has set up on all-Israeli one) to study the matter in lieu of an apology.

I think Cole is correct in observing that, while relations between Israel and Turkey are likely to remain bad for a while, a complete break in ties (or, at any rate, a sustained one) is improbable. Nevertheless, the two countries are playing chicken with one another. From what I understand, Netanyahu's position on the Gaza blockade and Israel's response to the flotilla are relatively popular in Israel, while Erdogan's position regarding this dispute is without question popular in Turkey. Moreover, Turkey (rightly, in my opinion) feels that it can do without Israel. The Turkish economy grew at a stunning 11.7% in the first quarter of 2010, second only to China among G-20 economies, following a rate of 6% growth in the last quarter of 2009. While it needs to be remembered that these numbers reflect only relative growth (i.e., compared to economic growth in the previous year, which was anemic in the case of Turkey), they are still impressive.

Whether or not Israel can do without Turkey is another question. As Dana Milbank reports this morning, Netanyahu certainly doesn't seem to need to worry about pressure from the Obama administration with respect to Gaza, but Turkey's status—particularly since the mid-1990s, when the Turkish and Israeli armed forces began a period of close cooperation—as Israel's only real friend (if not ally) in the region is clearly in jeopardy. Something tells me that even Netanyahu will think very closely before choosing to end this relationship entirely by blowing off Turkish demands for justice.

One aspect of the Turkish-Israeli row that hasn't been discussed much is what this tells about about the relative influence of the Turkish military in the formulation of foreign policy in Ankara. In 1996 Refah leader Necmettin Erbakan became prime minister after promising to "liberate Jerusalem" and rid the Turkish economy of "imperialism, Zionism, Israel, and the handful of champagne-drinking collaborators." Well, that didn't happen, and in fact military ties between Israel and Turkey became even stronger during the period of Erbakan's rule.

Unlike Erbakan, who was part of a coalition government which had very little legitimacy due to the unsavory manner in which it had come to power, Erdogan's AKP holds a majority in the Turkish parliament. Even more important, however, is the relative status of the Armed Forces in Turkey. For the past two years, military leaders in Turkey have consistently been put on the defensive, as the Ergenekon trials and the Sledghammer investigation have put dozens of active-duty officers (as well as many educators, civil society people, and journalists) behind bars under the accusation that they conspired to undertake a coup d'etat against the AKP. In the mid-1990s, the Turkish military was still in a strong position, so strong that they were able to force Erbakan to resign merely by strongly suggesting, in a series of news conferences , that they would intervene by force if Erbakan did not leave on his own accord.

Regardless of the true nature of the Ergenekon trials (I've discussed them at length elsewhere ), Turkey's dispute with Israel does seem to constitute a clear example of the degree to which the Turkish military's power over policymaking has declined in recent years.