Well,
the big story here is of course Russia's recognition of the
independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. On Russian state
television, the decision is being presented quite clearly as a response
to the recognition of Kosovo's independence earlier this year by the
United States and the European Union. Indeed, an extended excerpt of a
speech by Vladimir Putin in Germany last June in reaction to the
recognition of Kosovo's independence was shown on the news tonight. I'd
never seen it, but in it he clearly says that if such rules apply to
Kosovo, then they can apply to countries all over the world.
Indeed,
Russia's recognition today marks a reversal of a policy Russia had
followed since the end of the Cold War, in which Moscow steadfastly
insisted upon the principle of territorial integrity while the United
States and the European Union recognized the independence of one state
after another in the Balkans. While Russian support for Belgrade was
often presented in the Western media in terms of some kind of mystical
Orthodox brotherhood between the two countries, in fact Russia
supported Yugoslavia's territorial integrity because the Russian
Federation is itself divided into republics and autonomous regions
which could likewise break apart--and which appeared to be, for much of
the 1990s. Thus, despite the fact that the Russian government for years
supported the breakaway republics in Georgia, it never went as far as
to recognize their independence--until now.
But
Russia is playing a dangerous game. In adopting the approach of the
United States and Europe in recognizing--when it suits their
interests--the independence of such 'mini-republics,' Moscow has won a
battle. But does the Russian government really want to go down this
road? Russia today is far more stable than it was in the
1990s--Chechnya has largely been quieted, and Moscow has reasserted
control over republics like Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. But, in buying
into the logic of independence for 'mini-republics,' could the Russian
government be creating bigger problems for itself in the future?
For
the United States and Europe, meanwhile, I think damage control in
Georgia has to be accompanied by a new strategy in Ukraine--where the
Republic of the Crimea could emerge as a potentially disastrous
flashpoint between Russia and the West in the coming years. In Ukraine,
ethnic Russians almost unanimously oppose--often quite
passionately--the idea of Ukraine joining NATO. George W. Bush's
efforts to extend NATO membership to Ukraine could thus precipitate a
real crisis, leading to efforts in the Crimea (where the population is
overwhelmingly Russian) to secede from Ukraine and a possible Russian
recognition of this independence. No matter what, all talk of Ukraine's
entry into NATO has to come to an end.
Indeed,
the most obvious lesson to be learned from the events of this month is
that the White House's policy of beefing up the Georgian military and
encouraging NATO membership has been very counterproductive. Even
without Saakashvili's disastrous decision to attack South Ossetia,
Georgia's entry into the alliance would have precipitated a crisis with
the two breakaway republics, whose governments and populations were
steadfastly against taking part in any kind of anti-Russian military
alliance.
Entry
into the European Union, on the other hand, would have been welcomed by
a significant proportion of the populations of both republics. Imagine
how things might have worked out if, instead of pursuing NATO
memberships and attacking the two republics, Saakashvili had managed to
make serious progress towards membership in the European Union. Would
South Ossetia and Abkhazia really have continued to prefer
independence--as opposed to, say, a high level of autonomy within
Georgia--in the face of provisional Georgian membership in the EU?
It's
too late for Georgia, but this lesson needs to be applied to Ukraine.
If the United States and Europe wish to extend their influence in
Ukraine without provoking a showdown in the Crimea, the less risky path
would be to quietly accelerate Ukrainian ties to the European Union and
to abandon the idea--at least for now--of NATO membership.
Of
course, getting the Europeans to agree to this is another
question--especially given the generally low level of esteem with which
our current president is viewed in influential European capitals.
However, the Europeans are also disturbed by what occurred in Georgia
this month, and will perhaps be more receptive to suggestions which
seem constructive and unlikely to provoke.
But first, it will be necessary for Americans themselves to make a break with the policies which have led us to this situation.
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